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In the past, the primary objective of long term land retirement programs has been 
to reduce soil erosion on marginal cropland. However, these programs also have a 
major impact on supply. Land retirement programs were used in the early 1900s to 
control excess capacity (Dicks and Osborn). While erosion control is still the primary 
objective, supply control is a stated secondary objective of recent land use legislation. 
A prominent example of this kind of program is the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP), mandated in the Food Security Act of 1985. The stated objectives of the CRP 
are to: (I) reduce wind and water erosion on marginaJ, or highly erodible, cropland 
by diverting this land to less intensive uses, (2) reduce surplus production of 
commodities, (3) improve water quality, (4) foster wildlife habitat (Osborn, Llacuna, 
and Linsenbigler). Nearly 34 million acres of highly erodible cropland in the United 
States was enrolled with 333,392 Conservation Reserve Program contracts during the 
fmt nine signup periods from 1986 to 1990. 
Among the acres enrolled in the CRP are 10 million acres which have historical 
wht21 base and 3.8 million acres of com base. These acres could produce nearly 288 
million bushels of wheat and 342 million bushels of com each crop year (Osborn, 
1 
Llacuna, and Unsenbigler). Removing these acres from production may have had 
large impacts on the grain marketing system. Particularly in areas of high CRP 
participation, grain handlers as well as input suppliers, may have been subjected to 
severe competitive pressures as a result of decreased sales. 
A major unknown for analysts, policy makers. and agribusiness decision makers 
over the next few years is the extent to which CRP acres will return to crop 
production. Since most CRP contracts are for ten years, land enrolled in the CRP in 
1986 will be eligible for crop production when contracts begin to expire in 1996. As 
contracts expire annually, incremental increases in cropland due to CRP land enrolled 
in the first nine signups returning to crop production will occur each year through 
2CX)() as contracts expire yearly. In light of the potential impacts of 34 million acres 
of land becoming eligible for production, the question this research proposes to 
answer is: What effect will CRP contract expiration have on the supply and quantity 
demanded of wheat in the United States and on marketing margins at country 
elevators? 
Objectives 
The general objective of this research is to determine the effect of Conservation 
Reserve Program contract expiration on merchandising margins at country wheat 
elevators. This objective will be met by accomplishing three specific objectives: 
(I) Determine the percent of CRP land which producers intend to return to crop 
production as contracts expire. 
2 
(2) Forecast changes in the quantity of wheat produced and the subsequent price 
impacts in each year from 1996--2000 as CRP land returns to production. 
3 
(3) Determine the effect of the Conservation Reserve Program on country elevator 
marketing margins, returns to storage, and returns to merchandising activities. 
The first objective is accomplished using a two-limit Tobit model to correct 
survey data on producer intentions for nonresponse bias. A weighted mean of actual 
and imputed survey responses concerning land use intentions of CRP contract holders 
is calculated. 
The second objective is completed using a comprehensive market simulation 
model designed to determine price and quantity under alternative policies. A baseline 
is set assuming no CRP land returns to production. Yearly predictions of production 
and price are estimated. Two scenarios are considered: (I) the rate of recropping 
predicted in the first objective is applied to base acres and (2) 100 percent of the base 
acres idled under the CRP returns to production. 
The third objective is conducted under a theoretical framework derived to include 
policy variables such as the CRP in the specification of elevator merchandising 
margins. A case study of elevator margins in Oklahoma is conducted to demonstrate 
how this theory could be empiricized and to gain some insight on the influence of the 
CRP on elevator margins. The overall objective is met by combining the results of 
the three specific objectives to detennine the direction of change in elevator margins. 
To understand the potential influence of land use policies on commodity markets 
it is essential to realize the prominence of such policies in agriculture's history. The 
following section provides background into the most important land use policies of the 
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1900s. A detailed description of the Conservation Reserve Program is included in the 
subsequent section. 
Government Involvement in Soil Conservation 
Over the past sixty years government policies have been used to maintain an 
agricultural infrastructure capable of supplying potential demand and to prevent 
current surplus production of agricultural commodities by diverting marginal cropland 
to conserving uses. The prominence of soil conservation in American agriculture is 
evident by the major land use provisions of past and present agricultural legislation. 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 
The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 legislated the 
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) which is still used today to promote soil 
conservation. The objectives of the ACP are to improve soil fertility, minimize wind 
and water erosion, and conserve agricultural resources and wildlife. Under the ACP 
farmers are provided cost sharing for land use improvements and development of 
conservation practices which would not otherwise be carried out (Hallberg). The 
ACP provides incentives for farmers to invest in long term conservation practices. 
Bank'xad-Jooes farm Ienanc;y Act of 1937 
The Bankhead-lones Farm Tenancy Act of 1937 provided for the retirement of 
submarginal land which could not be economically farmed. Land retired under this 
act later became the National Grasslands of the Great Plains (Dicks and Osborn). 
A~ricultural Act of 1956 
The Agricultural Act of 1956 introduced two programs to provide for short- and 
long-term diversion of marginal cropland to conserving uses. These programs were 
the forerunners of current land usc policies. 
The Acreage Reserve Program (ARP) wa.s implemented from 1956 through 1958 
to curb production and protect marginal land from soil erosion. Under the ARP 
farmers signed one year contracts with the federal government to set aside a portion 
of program base acreage and receive payments to compensate for lost income (Aincs). 
Tcx1ay the ARP is mandatory for commcx1ity program participation. 
The Agricultural Act of 1956 also legislated the Soil Bank Reserve (SBR), 
commonly referred to as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), to provide for 
long term land d1version. from 1956 through 1960 more than 300,000 contracts 
were signed by land owners and the Secretary of Agricullurc to enroll more than 28 
million acres in the SBR. Under the terms of the contracts producers agreed not to 
harvest crops or to pasture land and to reduce the acreage of crops grown by the 
number of acres enrolled in the SBR. Producers received annual rental payments and 
cost sharing as compensation for convening cropland to conserving uses (Aines). 
Contracts under the Soil Bank lasted from three to ten years. The current 
Conservation Reserve Program, legislated by the Food Security Act of 198:5, was 
modeled after the Soil Bank Reserve. 
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Great Plains Conservation Pro2ram of 1956 
The Great Plains Conservation Program (GPC'P) 1s much like the Agricultural 
Conservation Program in that the objective was and 1s to prov1dc incentives to 
producers in the ten Great Plams states for a permanent diversiOn of marginal 
cropland to a grass cover (Dicks and Osborn). More than 60,000 contracts have been 
signed under the GPCP to divert more than 110 milhon acres of erodible land from 
crop production. 
Food and A&ricultural Act of 1965 
The Fcxx1 and Agricultural Act of 1965 provided for the Cropland Adjustment 
Program (CAP) in an atlcmpt to cut current st(X:.'b. The CAP offered five to ten year 
contracts to producers willing to develop conservation pract1ccs on cropland 
(Hallberg). 
Food S~urity Act of 1985 
The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA 1985) is one of the most comprehensive 
attempts at influencing agricultural land use. Existing programs such as the ARP 
were extended and several new programs and policies were mandated. 
The Paid Land Diversion (PLD) is a volunt.ary land retirement program which 
compensates producers for foregone production on land eligible for commodity 
program participation (crop acreage base). The concept of underplanting is one in 
which farmers who plant SO to 92 percent of their crop acreage base (CAB) of cotton 
and rice and devote the remaining CAB to conserving uses are eligible for up to 92 
percent of the deficiency payment provided by commodity program participation on 
the diverted acres. This program is commonly referred to as 50/92. This provision 
was later extended to wheat and feed grains as 0/92 under the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (Hallberg). 
Conservation compliance requires farmers to begin implementation of an 
approved conservation plan on highly erodible cropland by 1990 and complete the 
plan by 1995. Eligibility for deficiency payments under commodity program 
participation are denied to producers who do not adhere to the requirements of 
conservation compliance (Dicks, Ray, and Sanders). Similarly, the sodbuster and 
swampbuster provisions of FSA 1985 would deny commodity program benefits to 
producers who conven grassland or wetlands to cropland use. 
The largest conservation program mandated by FSA 1985 is the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP). Under the CRP farmers voluntarily diven marginal 
cropland from production to conserving uses. Because this research is concentrated 
on the impacts during and after the CRP a more detailed description of the program 
follows in the next section. 
Conservation Reserve Program 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was mandated under Title XII of 
the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA 1985) and later extended by Title XIV of the 
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA 1990) u the 
Environmental Coruerva.tion Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP). The primary 
purpose of the CRP is co reduce wind and water erosion on marginal, or highly 
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erodible. cropland by divening this land to less intensive uses. Secondary objectives 
include supply control. improvmg water quality. and fostering wildlife habitat. 
Agricultural producers who choose to enter into a CRP contract with the 
federal government are given an annual rental payment for the duration of the 
contract, usually ten years. and a one-time 50 percent cost share allowance for land 
conversion costs to establish conservation practices such as vegetative cover or 
terraces on highly erodible cropland. 
Annual rental payments are determined on an individual basis through 
competitive bids associated with specifically identified fields suhmined during a 
designated signup period by agricultural producers who wish to panicipate in the 
CRP. The Secretary of Agriculture determines a maximum acceptable rental rate 
(MARR) for each multicounty area, referred to as land pools. after all producer bids 
have been submitted. Land pools encompass counties with similar soil erosion rates, 
production levels, and other land characteristics. 
8 
County Agricultural Stabili1.ation and Conservation Service (ASCS) committees 
review each submission. Bids wh1ch exceed the applicable MARR are not accepted 
for enrollment in the CRP. However, if the committee determines that the bid 
exceeds the locaJ cash rental rate for comparable land, even a bid lower than the 
MARR may not be accepted (Osborn, Llacuna, and Linsenbigler). This process of 
competitive bidding potentially provides equitable compensation to producers by 
establishing a competitive market which determines price (rent) based on the erosion 
and productive potential of the field while minimizing government costs of the CRP. 
Payments to individual contract holders for participation in the CRP may not exceed 
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$50,000 annually. This payment limitation is independent of limits set for commodity 
program panicipation. However, land enrolled in the CRP with established crop 
acreage base (CAB) which normally is eligible for commodity program panicipation 
and federal deficiency payments through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is 
not eligible for payments associated with those programs during the period of the 
contract. The producer will retain established CAB and commodity program 
eligibility UJXm expiration of the CRP contract. 
The original mandate for the Conservation Reserve Program began in fisc41 
yea.r 1986 and extended through fiscal yea.r 1990. During this time nine signup 
periods were held. As the Conservation Reserve Program was implemented, 
eligibility for enrollment differed by signup to ensure that the most marginal cropland 
would be diverted from production during the first signup periods. In later signup 
periods. eligibility requirements were relaxed to expand the amount of cropland 
eligible for CRP participation and to increase the number of acres planted to trees as 
a conservation practice. In addition, the fourth signup period offered incentives 
commonly referred to as •corn bonus" to entice producers from the Corn Belt to 
enroll corn base acres in the CRP. 
Prior to establishment of vegetative cover or other conservation practices, 
erosion of soil on land enrolled in the CRP was extensive. Over three million acres 
currently enrolled in the CRP had annual erosion rates of over forty tons of soil per 
acre per year. Nearly 30 million acres were eroding at a rate of over ten tons per 
acre per year before the establishment of conservation practices. However, under the 
CRP erosion has been reduced on average by 19 tons per acre per year. For 
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contracts over 500 acres erosion has boen reducro on average by 20 tons per acre per 
year (Osborn, Llacuna. and Linsenbigler). Clearly, the CRP has been successful in 
controlling soil erosion on marginal cropland. A summary of average reduction in 
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Figure I. Summary of Average Reduction in Soil Eroston due to the 
Conservation Reserve Program by Number of Acres Enrolled. 
II 
Summary 
The preceding pages described how the supply control objective of the 
Conservation Reserve Program may have impacted components of the marketing 
system, defined the objectives of this research, and provided background into the past 
land retirement legislation and the Conservation Reserve Program. Although the 
specific objectives of this research are motivated by the same general problem and 
combine to accomplish an overall objective, each specific objective lends its own 
contribution to the current body of knowledge and will be accomplished using a 
separate procedure. The following three chapters repon research conducted to 
accomplish each specific objective. These chapters include more concise definitions 
of each of the problems addressed, contribution to knowledge, relevant theory, 
results, and implications of research conducted. The final chapter consists of a 
summary and suggestions for funher research. 
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CHAPTER II 
RECROPPING RATES OF CONSERVATION 
RESERVE PROGRAM ACREAGE 
Background 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was mandated by the h:>Od Secunly 
Act of 1985 to protect marginal cropland from soil erosion. Under the CRP. the 
contract holder receives an annual payment from the government in exchange for 
establishing and maintaining a conservation practice on highly erodible land for ten 
years. Through the first nine signup periods the CRP has reduced available cropland 
by nearly 34 million acres, mcluding 18 million acres which will retain crop acreage 
base (CAB) when the contract expires. The first CRP contracts expire in 1996 and 
subsequent contracts expire through 2000. A major unknown for analysts, policy 
makers, and agribusiness decision makers over the next few years is producer land 
usc tntentions as Conservation Reserve Program contracts expire. The rate of land 
returning to crop production, or the recropping rate, is of panicular interest because 
of the potential impact on government program costs and commodity supplies. 
The Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS) conducted a national survey 
of 2, 739 contract holders through sign up nine in 1990, in part to determine the post-
CRP land use intentions of contract holden. The 2,016 responses (74 percent) 
13 
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represent 366,818 acres of CRP land. Based on these responses Nowak. Schnepf. 
and Barnes found that 41.9 percent of the respondents had plans to return a portion of 
their CRP acreage to crop production. However. th1s csttmate was not weighted by 
Lhe number of acres controlled by individual producers and therefore does not dm.'l:tly 
predict the proportion of CRP acres returning to crop production. Osborn ( 1992al 
weighted the responses by acres to find that the rate of expt.'Ctl'd recroppmg was 52.7 
percent of the acres enrolled in the program. 
This paper shows that the SWCS survey suffered from nonrcsponse bias and 
then determines expected rate of recropping usmg the SWCS survey adJUSted for 
nonresponsc bias. The methods used go beyond Osborn by corn..-cting for 
nonrcsponsc bias. A two"hmit Tobit model IS used to impute the rate of rccroppmg 
for nonrcspondents to correct the SWCS survey dald for nonrcsJXmSC b1as. This 
allows calculation of the weighted mean of rccroppmg corrected for nonrcsponsc bias. 
Land U~ Alternatives 
Characteristics of land enrolled in the Conscrvauon Reserve Program and the 
conservation pracuces developed under the program coupled with various land usc 
policy provisions make the determination of post-CRP land usc somewhat difficult. 
Many alternatives are available to contract holders when the CRP expJres. Among 
these are leaving the conservation practice in place or using the land for crop or 
livestock production. Land may be left in vegetative cover for several reasons. 
To be eligible for enrollment in the CRP. land had to meet specific signup 
criteria. Although later signups were more liberal in these requirements, all land 
l'i 
enrolled in the CRP qualtfies as margtna.l or h1ghh' erod1hle. Margmal arres may he 
less producuve, or more difficult or less profitable 10 farm. Howevn. 11 has ht'l'n 
1mplied and understood that more than ~~ mill1on acres enn,llt'li m the first nnw 
stgnups will ret.atn crop acre.agc base and com modi!~ progr.un elig1bility as ( 'RP 
contracts exp1re. Th1s provides some economil..' mn·nttve for producers to return 
these acres to crop production. Additionally, nat1ve or mtrodu(.'Cd grass cover has 
tx.-en the mam conscr.·a!Jon practH.:c under the CRP. Th1s grass nwcr Cllllld he c.asll~ 
!lllcd and converted to cropland. Less than b !X'rl'crl! nl the .\4 nulilon ann cnwlkd 
from !986 to 19'10 were planted to trt'l'\ whll'h would rn~tkc cultiV<IIllln more costly. 
In additiOn. other land u-.c poltc1es rnu'>t he conmkred. Ciovcrnrnt'nt program\ 
and JXlilcy pronswns will ltkely mtlucncc the u-.c ot CRP land a-. colllracl\ exptrt• 
Cons.cr.·atton compltancc. leg1slatc<.l by the 1-ood St•cunty Act of lt>H5. prov1dc\ 
economiC dtsmccnttvcs for crop pnxluctton. Produl'cr<. mu\t dcvl'lop and implement 
an approved conservatiOn plan on crodthle cropland 111 order to rcm;un cli~thle for 
C'ommodtty Credit Corporation (CCC) loam and dcf1c1cncy payment\ The ccononm: 
co~ts of conservation compliance and the JX>tcntJal lms of government payment\ rna y 
d1scourage producers from rcturnmg crooihlc land cnrollc<l m the CHP to crop 
production. In add1t10n. CHP land may rcmatn 1dlcd under the acrCdgc rc<.luctwn 
program (ARP) wh1ch rc.qu1rcs a JXlr110n of crop acrc~gc ha-.c he \CI ac,1dc from crop 
production to maintain program eligibility. Also. flexibility provisions (normal flex 
acres) and participation in underplanting programs (t.c. 0-50192) would allow 
producers to leave CRP land idle while participating in government programs. 
Because it is not known whether producers consider these provisions as alternatives, 
the determination of post-CRP land use is somewhat uncen.ain. 
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From 1956 to 1960 more than 28 million acres of cropland were enrolled in 
the Soil Bank Reserve (SBR), commonly referred to as the conservation reserve. The 
SBR was used as a model to develop the provisions of the current CRP. Land from 
the SBR was eligible for crop production beginning in 1960 and extending through 
1970. One attempt at estimating land use inrentions as SBR contracts eJtpired 
determined that 55 percent of the land enrolled would be returned to crop production 
(Aines). However, nearly 97 percent of the 28 million acres in the SBR were 
returned to crop production shortly after the contracts expired (Cacek). It must be 
realized, though, that land enrolled in the SBR was more productive than land in the 
current CRP since no land erosion criteria were specified for enrollment eligibility. 
Also, the other land use programs mentioned above had not been legislated at the time 
of SBR eJtpiration. Therefore, the Soil Bank provides only limited insight into the 
land use intentions of current CRP contract holders. The post-CRP era should be 
analyzed using the land use intentions of contract holders while remembering the 
lessons of the Soil Bank. 
Correctim: for Nonresponse Bias 
In most sample surveys some level of incompleteness occurs. The most 
prevalent sources of incompleteness result from survey nonresponse. Survey 
nonresponse creates problems since data that are intended to be observed are missing 
leading to less efficient estimates. Bias may exist if respondents are systematically 
different than nonrespondents (Rubin). 
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Two types of nonresponse can lead to bias: unit nonresponse and item 
nonresponse. Unit nonresponse occurs when some members of the survey sample fail 
to respond to the survey instrument (response rate is less than 100 percent). Unit 
nonresponse is almost impossible to alleviate entirely. In most cases, a response rate 
of 20 percent is considered adequate if the resulting sample comprises I percent of the 
population. However, if the respondents are statistically different in some aspects 
than nonrespondents, unit nonresponse bias exists and inefficient estimates may result. 
The survey conducted by the Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS) in 
1990 generated a response rate of nearly 74 percent representing approximately 1 
percent of the acres in the CRP. Although this response rate falls into the 
conventional guidelines, it is imponant to determine if unit nonresponse bias exists. 
Item nonresponse occurs when members of the survey sample respond to 
some, but not all, questions on the questionnaire. Many times item nonresponse is 
associated with a request for information that is not easily available to sample 
members or a poorly planned or worded question. In the SWCS survey, item 
nonresponse was created by a flaw in the survey instrument where sample members 
were instructed to skip the question relating to post-CRP land use intentions if no 
decision had been made. Item nonresponse bias occurred automatically since those 
who answered the question (had plans for CRP land) were systematically different 
from those who failed ID answer the question (did not have plans for CRP land). It is 
imponant, however, to determine other characteristics which distinguish respondents 
to item nonrespondents in order to correct for item nonresponse bias. 
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Rubin stares that "complete-data methods cannot be immediately used" for 
estimation when nonresponse bias exists. Therefore, it must be determined if 
nonresponse bias exisrs in the SWCS survey data and whether some method of 
correction must be used to complete the data so that the most likely pm:Jictions of the 
rate of land returning 10 crop production can be made. 
Data imputation is a procedure used to adJust for survey nonresponse bias by 
replacing each missing value due to nonresponse with an acceptable prediction of 
response (Rubin). Imputation is similar to weighting responses more heavily to adjust 
for nonrespondents with similar characteristics. In the ca.'iC of the SWCS survey data, 
a model of respondents can be estimated which can then be applied to nonrespondcnts 
to predict the missing value. However, because the cause of nonrcsponse is 
unlmown. correcting for bias is often difficult (Rubin). 
Through modelling, data imputation incorporates the analyst's knowledge 
related to the factors which may innuence the likely response. In order to predict a 
response for post-CRP land use, a model of the CRP contract can be used to estimate 
the innuence of such factors as conservation practice and rental payment on the land 
use decision. In using data imputation it must be assumed that nonresponse bias does 
not extend beyond that explained by the background variables which can be observed, 
tested, and used in correcting for nonresponse bias (Rubin). 
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Procedures and Data 
Testin~ Survey Data 
Data regarding each CRP contract holder in the United States are available on 
a data base maintained by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service 
(ASCS). Since data on the population are available, this survey presents an unusual 
opportunity to test and correct for nonresponse bias. 
The SWCS survey sample of 2, 739 contract holders is drawn from the ASCS 
national data tapes of 333,392 contracts nationwide through the ninth sign up. The 
survey requested information about the operator such as age, income, and education. 
In addition, information on conservation practices, satisfaction with the decision to 
enroll in the CRP, and characteristics of the farm enterprise was requested. 
The data used in testing the validity of the SWCS survey data came from the 
national CRP tapes for signup periods one through nine. The survey respondents are 
identified by contract number and matched to the corresponding observation on the 
CRP tapes to ensure consistent data between the population and the sample. Although 
2,016 responses were gathered, only 1,930 of these matched an observation on the 
CRP data tapes. The data for the respondents contained the 1, 930 observations that 
returned the survey and matched an observation in the population of CRP contracts. 
The nonrespondents contained 809 observations which were not returned or were not 
matched to the population. 1 In their own testing, the Economic Research Service was 
1The 86 observations from the sample which could not be matched to the population were 
tested using at-test to determine if they may significantly affect the direction of any bias. It was 
determined that omitting these observations does not affect the results of the bias testing. 
also unable to match some oi the c-ontract numhcrs. Sampk sin~ ior variables which 
may not appear in each observauon (e.g. wheat ytdd) co~spc.,nds to the numhcr of 
respondents wtth the anrihutc in quesllon. For C\ampk. l)nly 1.081 contr.tct holders 
w1th wheat yield responded tn the survey. thcrctnrl'. ~tmpk sttl' 1s 1,08 I. In the GlSt' 
of base acreage. missing values arc set to 1ero. 
The data on the CRP tapes is ordered by C~P cnntr.tct. Smce a farm m~ty 
have multtple contracts, the contract data arc aggregatetl for t'.tl·h farm for both the 
s.ample and the fXlpulatlon. The aggregatton ts done by '>lllllrntn~ over all nmtrad'> 
from each farm for those vanables pertaintng ttl arrc~tge (e.g. acres cnwlled). F(lr 
vanablc\ such as yield and rent. an avcr.:lge wctghtcd by the numher of acn.·s per 
contract t'> ca.lculatcd over contracts to obta111 a stnglt' numtwr for e~teh farm. For lht• 
vanablc describing land capability class. the acres acn.-ptcd per contract wert· added 
by capability class over the contracts to deterrnrne the tnt~tl acreage tn each class for 
both each farm. Stmilarly. acre~ wcrr summed over corN .. ·rvatton practice to obta1n 
the total acreage 1n each conservatiOn pracllcc. Thc-.c aggrcgatiom provtdc for 
consistent farm level data between the population and the <:.ample. 
A cht-square test for gcJ<xJnc\\ of-ftt wa., u-.cd to dctcrr111nc how well the 
SWCS survey data fit the distnbut10n of the population. Stncc the ch1 square tc'>IS the 
entire distribution instead of just first moment\ 11 ts a more powerful tcr.;t than a tc\t 
of two means. A t-test of means is also used to sub<,tantiate the chi-square and 
determine the direction of any bias. 
The chi-square test statistic is calculated as the squared difference between the 
number of sample observations observed in the 1"' category and the number of 
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observations expected in the i• category based on the population, divided by the 
expected number in the i• category, summed over all categories for each variable. 
(1) L',. 1 (X.-milm, 
where: 
X, == the number observed from the i• category of the sample, and 
m, = the number expected from the i• category of the sample based on the 
population; or sample size multiplied by the percent of the population in the j• 
category (Shannon). 2 
The category divisions for the chi-square test are inherent to discrete variables, 
such as land capability class, since each class represents one category. The case of 
continuous variables (i.e. CRP acres) presents a problem in that the categories must 
be created based on the units to be measured (100 acres to SOO acres is one category, 
etc.). Here, categories are created by adding or subtracting multiples of the standard 
deviation to or from the mean for each variable from the population and creating ten 
categories. For example, between the average and . 25 standard deviations above the 
average is one category. Although information may be lost in the process of 
1Sorne question has arisen over the correct method for calculating a chi-square statistic during 
the course of this testing. Osborn, conducting chi-square lesl\ on land capahility class, calculated 
the squared difference in the percentage in each category between the population and the sample 
and divided by the percentage from the population summed over the classes to arrive at the test 
statistic (Osborn, 1992b). This method is incorrect in that it fails to account for the size of the 
sample in any way. To clarify, Snedecor states, ·results are often reponed not in numbers 
originally counted but IS percentages of individuals having the attribute; that is, IS so many per 
hundred enumerated. It is clear that such percenlaies cannot be used directly in the calculation 
of chi-square except in the cue where the wnple size is an even hundred. In all other wnples, 
before cbi-square is computed the percentage must be convened to the actual number of 
individuals found with the attribute.· Therefore, the percent of total in each category for the 
population must be converted to the expected frequency from the sample by multiplying by 
wnple size (to get m in the formula). 
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transforming quantitative data into qualitative data, the process is based on the first 
and second moments of the probability distribution. The data transformation is 
necessary to conduct the chi-square goodness--of-fit test and does not weaken the test. 
Once the categories are created, each observation from the population and the 
sample fits into one of the ten categories measuring the number and percent of total in 
each category for each data set. The test statistic is calculated by measuring the 
difference between observed and expected frequencies. as in equation ( 1) above. 
The null hypothesis of the chi-square tesl is that the population and the sample 
have the same distribution, or: 
where: 
P, is the probability distribution of the population and 
P, is the probability distribution of the sample. 
Only an approximation of the population mean from the sample is known. 
Therefore, the t-test is caJculated as: 
-
(2) t ,. X- ~ 
s I /1r 
where: 
-
X is the sample mean 
I' is the population mean 
s is the standard deviation of the sample, and 
n is the number of observations in the sample. 
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The null hypothesis is rejected if the calculated t-st.atistic is larger than the 
critical value of a t-distribution with the corresponding degrees of freedom. The 
degrees of freedom is the number of observations in the sample. 
The sample of respondents is compared to the sample of nonrespondents using 
the chi-square method described previously to determine if the subsamples have 
similar distributions. The means for the respondents and nonrespondents are then 
calculated and compared using a t-test between samples to determine the direction of 
any bias. 
To test whether item nonresponse bias occurred. the data for those contract 
holders who had plans for CRP land after the contract expires are compared to data 
for those without plans. The data for item respondents represents the 886 contract 
holders who responded to the post-CRP land usc question. The sample of 1,130 item 
nonrespondents includes those contract holders who indicated no decision had been 
made concerning land use. 
The tests for unit and item nonresponse bias are identical except for the 
observations in the respective samples. The samples are compared using the chi-
square test as well as a t-test. The null hypothesis of the t-test is that the difference 
between the sample means is zero: 
H,;. (IJ.I-IJ.l)=O 
HA: (IJ.J-IJ.l)fl0 
The test uses a pooled variance estimate which is calculated as: 
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(3) 
In order to use this pooled variance estimate, the difference between the sample 
variance estimates is zero. 1 The test statistic is: 
(4) 
This test differs from the t-test illustrated in (2) because (2) is a test between a true 
population and a sample while (4) is a test between two samples. The tests conducted 
under (1) and (2) indicate only whether a bias exists in the SWCS survey data. The 
tests for unit or item nonresponse bias conducted with equations (1) and (4) more 
precisely define the source and direction of the bias. If the results of these tests show 
that bias exists, or more specifically that unit or item nonresponse bias exists, in the 
SWCS survey, the data must be adjusted to obtain more consistent estimates. 
Data Imputation 
The SWCS survey data is adjusted for response bias by estimating the 
recropping rate of all nonrespondents to obtain a recropping value for every contract 
holder who was surveyed (2, 739). The two-limit Tobit model is used since the 
dependent variable (recropping rate) is censored at both an upper and lower value 
(100 and 0 percent, respectively). The Tobit returns a set of estimators which 
'The difference between the variance estimates has not been tested e:~~:plicitly. We assumed 
that this condition holds in this case from the Central Limit Theorem. 
maximizes a specified log likelihood function. This set of estimators maximizes the 
probability of predicting a value of the recropping rate is the actual value. The log 
likelihood function of the two-limit Tobit model is: 
(5) 
where: 
logl=(l-ll) •{l-ad) •(( -(r-:r.b)2/(2 •s))-
·' •ln(2•x •s))+(U•In(cdfn(U•rl-:r.b)f../i))) + 
(ul•ln(l-ul•cdfrt((ru -:r.b)I/S))) 
logl is the log likelihood function, 
II is the lower limit of the dependent variable (recropping =0), 
ul is the upper limit of the dependent variable (recropping = 100), 
r is the rate of recropping for survey respondents, 
xb is the X matrix of independent variables multiplied by the vector of 
estimators, 
s is the variance estimate, 
In is the natural log operator, 
cdfn is the cumulative distribution function, 
rl is 0 if the dependent variable is at the lower limit, and 
ru is 100 if the dependent variable is at the upper limit. 
The log likelihood function and the maximum likelihood procedure for the two-limit 
Tobit model was performed in GAUSS econometrics software. The iteration 
procedure used to obtain convergence of the log likelihood function to a maximum is 
a quasi-Newton secant method which updates the Hessian after each iteration 
(REFERENCE). The resulting parameter estimates are used to predict the recropping 
rate of unit and item nonrespondents. 
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In the SWCS survey producers were askod whether they had plans for their 
land when their contract expired. The respondents who answered "yes" to this 
question were asked what those plans were. One of the options was to estimate the 
percent of land that would be returned to crop production under a conservation 
compliance plan. Another was to estimate the percent of land that would be 
recropped without a conservation compliance plan. The sum of these options reported 
by the respondent was used as the dependent variable in the models. Of the 886 
respondents who indicated that plans had been made for their CRP acres, 434 did not 
plan to resume crop production (recrop=O), and 250 planned to crop 100 percent of 
the land enrolled in the program. The remaining 202 planned to crop some 
proportion of their CRP land less than I 00 percent. Since data on the independent 
variables for those who failed to return the survey are limited to those existing on the 
ASCS national data base while the data available for those without land use plans also 
include responses to other survey questions, two models are specified, one for each 
source of bias. Each model is estimated using the available data for respondents. 
The parameter estimates are then used with the data available for nonrespondents to 
predict missing values of recropping rates. To predict recropping of unit 
nonresponders the following model is specified: 
(6) 
where: 
RECROP;;P0 •P 1SIZEPCT•P2CRPACRE+P 3RENT+ 
P.EROS/ONB+P,SLT+P~A1VPCT+P1TREEPCT 
RECROP is percent of CRP acres expected to be returned to crop production, 
SIZEPCf is the percent of all farm land acres in CRP, 
CRPACRE is the number of acres enrolled in the CRP program, 
RENT is the annual rental payment under the CRP contract. 
EROSIONB is the erosion rate on the CRP acres prior to cover establishment, 
SLT is soil loss tolerance of the land enrolled in the CRP, 
NATVPCf is the percent of CRP acres in native grass, and 
TREEPCf is the percent of CRP acres in trees. 
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This model is estimated using data available on the ASCS national data tapes 
for ~mple members who indicated their JX)St-CRP intentions. Each regressor 
characterizes the CRP contract or the farm operation. The hypothesis that these 
regressors influence JX)St-CRP land use intentions is tested in this estimation. The 
expected influence of each independent variable on RECROP, the proportion of land 
the contract holder expects to return to crop production, is described separately. 
Two of the independent variables are included to represent the number of acres 
enrolled in the CRP and the relationship of this land to the overall farming operation. 
These include SIZEPCf and CRP. 
SIZEPCf is the proportion of the contract holders farm which is enrolled in 
the CRP. Some analysts believe that many older producers enrolled a large 
proportion of their farms in the CRP in order to begin retirement on the annual rental 
payments. If this has been the case, the larger the proportion of the overall farm 
enrolled in the CRP, the less likely the land will be returned to crop production as 
contracts expire. 
CRPACRE is the number of acres enrolled in the CRP. The total opportunity 
cost of keeping cropland idled increases as the number of acres are increased. 
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Therefore, the more acres enrolled in the CRP by the contract holder the more likely 
that land will be returned to crop production. 
The productive capacity of land enrolled in the CRP will likely influence the 
decision to return the land to crop production. The model to adjust for unit 
nonresponse bias is specified to include three regressors which represent the value of 
the land. 
The independent variable RENT represents the annual rental payment received 
by the CRP contract holder. Since rental bids are made by producers in a competitive 
process, the value and productivity of land enrolled in the CRP would be reflected in 
the annual rental payment. If the land enrolled in one contract is comparably more 
productive than other CRP land, the annual rental payment would be greater since the 
opportunity cost of enrollment would be greater. For this reason, a higher rental 
payment is hypothesized to lead to a higher proportion of CRP land returning to crop 
production. 
The erosion rate of CRP land prior to enrollment (EROSIONB) should be an 
indication of the erodibility of the same land if it is recropped. The costs of returning 
highly erodible land to production would be higher due to conservation compliance 
provisions. 
If the soil loss tolerance (SLT), as measured by the universal soil Joss 
equation, is high, the erodibility of the land is relatively low. So, from similar logic 
used to derive expectations about the influence of EROSIONB, it is expected that the 
parameter estimate associated with SL T will be positive. 
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The type of vegetative cover established on the acres enrolled in the CRP will 
also likely influence the decision to return land to crop production. CRP acres 
planted to native grass are more likely to be convened to crop production than those 
acres planted to trees. The percent of CRP acres in native grass (N A TVPCT) is 
hypothesized to be positively related to the rate of rccropping. Conversely, the 
percent of CRP acres covered with trees (TREEPC'T) is hyJX>thesized to be inversely 
related to the rate of recropping. 
The model used to correct for item nonresponse bias includes the variables 
mentioned above. plus some variables corresponding to responses to SWCS survey 
questions. The model which will be used to predict the posr-CRP land use for those 
who indicated that no decision had been reached is: 
(7) 
where: 
RECRQP .. ~0 .. ~ 1SIZEPCT • p 1CRPACRE .. p )RENT • p 4EROS/ONB .. 
P,SLT + P6NA 1VPCT + P,TREEPCT + P,UNDBUY + 
P~AY• P10UNDVAL• P110WNOP• P120LDER• 
P13UVE/NC•P 14CROPFARM•PuOFFFARM 
RECROP is percent of CRP acres which will be returned to crop production, 
SIZEPCT is the number of CRP acres relative to all farm land, 
CRPACRE is the number of acres enrolled in the CRP program, 
RENT is the annuaJ payment under the CRP contract, 
EROSIONB is the erosion rate on the CRP acres prior to cover establishment, 
SL T is soil loss tolerance of the land enrolled in the CRP, 
NA TVPCT is the percent of CRP acres in native grass, 
TREEPCT is the percent of CRP acres in trees, 
LANDBUY is 1 if CRP payments used to purchase land; 0 otherwise. 
HAY is 1 if contract would be extended if haying allowed; 0 otherwise. 
LANDVAL is the current market value of land enrolled in CRP, 
OWNOP is 1 if the contract holder is the owner; 0 otherwise, 
OLDER is 1 if contract holder IS over the age of ~5; 0 otherwise, 
LIVEINC is the percent of total farm mcome attnbutabk to livestock, 
CROPFARM is 1 if 50% of total farm income ~wributablc to crop production. and 
OFFF ARM is the percent of tolal mcomc from nonfarm sources. 
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These regressors characten1e the CRP contract. the operator, and the farming 
operation. The data required to estunatc this model arc available from the ASCS 
national data base and responses to the SWCS survey. The mdcpcndcnt vanablc. 
RECROP. is the s.amc for both model specifications. The hypotheses previously 
stated for the unit nonrcsponsc model arc consi'>tent between the spccificatmns. 
However, hypotheses arc required for additional independent variables in the item 
nonresponse model. 
LANDBUY is a dummy variable which i<> one 1f the CRP rental payment wa\ 
used to buy arable farmland during the ten year contract and zero otherwise. If land 
was financed with the CRP payment being a primary source of repayment, other 
means of cash inflow may be required m order to continue repayment. It is expected 
that if land was purchased with the CRP rental payment (LANDBUY is one) a higher 
proportion of land will be returned to crop production. 
If the survey respondent indicated that the CRP contract would be extended if 
limited haying were allowed on the land enrolled, then HAY is one, otherwise, HAY 
IS zero. The propensity to extend the contract and tht.• dcsm.' to hay the grass 1.'!1 
current CRP land. most likely for cx1sting ll\cStlX'k, suggests the contract 
holdcrlresl-Xlndcnt will be less hkely to return the land to crop production. 
ll 
LANDV AL IS the current market rental value of tht.• land under CRP conlr.tct. 
Smce h1ghcr rents could be demanded for more pnxlu~-.'tiH' land. 11 1s t.'Xpt.'l..'ted tiMt 
LANDV AL would be positively rcla!t.-d to the r;ttc of recroppm~. That is, the h1ghcr 
the rental value of the land. the more ltkely it will tx· rctumt.·d Ill crop production. 
Owners of margmal cropland may be nwa· pmtel'tive stewMds of the soil 111 
order to sustatn productivity mto the future. OWNOP I'> one 1f the contr.tt.:l hnllkr I'> 
the owner of the land and 1ero 1 f l1c or she 1 s not 
Ol.DER t<; an mdcpcndl.'nt vanahlc to <ktcrmlllc what lnfluL'Ilcc thl' contral."t 
holder':-. age wlll have on the dccJ<>Jon to return land to crop production OLDU~ h;i\ 
a value of one 1f the contract holder 1\ over the age of)) and i' 1ero othcrwJ\c. 
Presuming that many older agncultural producer'> enrolkd land 111 the CRP to hegm 
retirement. 1t 1~ expected that OLDLR will have <Ill 1nvcr\C rclatHHl\hlp w1th the r<ttc 
of recropping. 
Agricultural producers w1th a large percentage of farm mcornc attnhuUthlc to 
livestock enterprises may cons1dcr leaving vegeta11vc cover on CRP land after the 
contract expires to use as forage. Convcr~10n cmts would he lower than 1f the land 
were prepared for crops. For th1s rea~n. LIVEINC, the percent of farm income 
from livestock activities, is hypothcsiuxl to negatively influence rccroppmg rate. 
If the majority of farm income is attnbut.ablc to row crop production, it is 
likely that land in the CRP would be converted to this use. CROPFARM is one if at 
least 50 percent of total farm income results from crop pn.x1uction. When 
CROPF ARM is one. the rate of recropping is hypothesized to be higher. 
The percent of total income that is earned from nonfarm sources (OFFFARM) 
is expected to have a negative influence on the proportion of land returned to crops 
since income from that land is less vital. 
The models used for data imputation are estimated using the data available for 
respondents who had plans for CRP land. The maxmtum likclih<xxl estimators arc 
used with data of nonrespondents to predict the missing responses. These predictions 
are then adjusted so that the resulting predicted value of rccroppmg imputed for 




adjprt= 100•(1-cdfn(( 100-prtd}/.,·)) • 
(cdjn((IOO-prtd)fs-cdfn( -prtd/s)) • 
prtd ~s•(pdfn( prul/s) 
pdjn((lOO-prtd)fs)) 
adjpre is the adjusted prediction value of the rate or rccropping, 
cdfn is the cumulative distribution function, 
pred is the predicted value of the rate of recropping from the two-limit Tobit, 
s is the variance estimate, and 
pdfn is the probability distribution function. 
This adjustment is essential since the estimators are calculated within the same 
relevant range by the two-limit Tobit model specification and predicted values must be 
censored at upper and lower limits. 
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The mean of recropping weighted by CRP acres and adjusted for nonresponse 
bias is: 
(9) - ERECROPi ~ X~ = ==------~~ 
W; 
where (i = 1,2, ... .n} 
where: 
RECROPi is the actual or predicted percent of CRP acres which the ilh contract 
holder intends to return to crop production, and 
Wi is the number if CRP acres enrolled by the ilh contract holder. 
This weighted mean, adjusted for unit and item nonresponse, indicates the 
proportion of CRP acres which will be returned to crop production if CRP contracts 
are not extended. This estimate of the rate of recropping represents the best estimate 
of post-CRP land use intentions of contract holders from the first nine signup periods. 
Results 
Results of Survey Testin2 
Results of the chi-square testing showed that the sample was significantly 
different than the population (at 10%, df=9) for 10 of the 20 variables tested. 
Included in these are some of the most important variables such as land capability 
class, acres enrolled, farm size, rent, and conservation practices. For each variable 
that was significantly different under the chi-square criterion, the means were also 
found to be different using a t-test. Results of the chi-square and the means tests 
between the population and the sample can be seen in Table I. 
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TABLE I 
CHI-SQUARE AND MEANS TESTS OF SWCS 
SAMPLE VS. NATIONAL POPULATION 
OF CRP CONTRACTS 
C&lcul&Ud Population S&IDPie S&IDPle C&lculateJ 
Variable Clu-square Mean Moan Sar.e t-slatishc 
Farm uze 19.46 362.47 320.28 1930 -3.07 
CRP Acres 60.05 101.75 92.88 1930 -2.64 
Pet. Farm 70.07 O.S6 0.50 1930 -7.58 
Bid Amount 17.S6 55.26 56.81 1930 3.42 
LCC' 482.07 3.44 3.41 NIA NIA 
Wheat Base 14.94 30.88 25.89 1930 -2.90 
Com Base 12.50 11.34 11.61 1930 0.04 
Barley Base 9.58 8.20 7.08 1930 ·1.24 
R1ce Base 1.35 0.04 0.01 1930 -0.33 
Sorghum Base 6.37 7.08 6.92 1930 -0.20 
Upland Ba.o;e 4.32 3.91 J .87 1930 -D.06 
ELS Base' 0.01 0.00 1930 
Oal.li Ba.o;e 10.28 3.87 J 67 1930 -0.65 
Wheal Yield~ 35.80 27.40 27.34 1081 -<UJ 
Com Yaeld1 24.88 84.83 86.49 836 1.98 
Barley Yaeld~ 7.07 39.34 39.45 236 0.15 
R1ce Y1eld~ 5.50 3879.35 4166.00 
Sorghum Y1eld: 7.75 47.23 46.69 352 ..Q.63 
Upland Y1eld2 9.20 372.07 356.25 98 -1.07 
ELS Yield: 381.46 0.00 0 
Oats Yield1 24 . .50 50.44 50.75 503 0.66 
'Means weiJbted by CRP acres 
~earu weaghted by crop htie acll!fl 
,No non-zero resporues 
~earu; not calculated on local conservation practaces 
Note: For Chi -tquare: df"" 9: a = .10, X7 "" 14.6837; a "" .05, X1 ,.. 16.919 
These results indicate that the SWCS sample does not adequately represent the 
distribution of CRP acres for the nation. Therefore, the data will produce biased 
estimates of the rate of recropping. 
Further investigation indicates that the survey suffers from two independent 
sources of bias. First, the results of the chi-square and means tests for unit 
nonresponse showed that many of the same variables were also significantly different 
between survey respondents and nonrespondents. This indicates that unit nonresponse 
bias occurred in the survey data since respondents are systematically different from 
the nonrespondents. In this case, larger farms with more acres enrolled in the CRP 
tended to not return the survey, thereby biasing the means of the sample. Results of 
the chi-square and means tests to determine whether unit nonresponse bias occurred 
and the direction of the bias are shown in Table II. 
The second source of bia'l which was tested was item nonreponsc bias. Item 
nonresponse occurred in the SWCS because a distinction was made between contract 
holders with plans for their CRP acres and those without plans. Results of the t-tests 
between these subsamples indicate that many factors are significantly different. Those 
producers without plans had fewer acres in the program but received a higher annual 
rental payment. The direction of the item nonresponse bias may lead to 
overestimation of the rate of land returning to crop production. Results of the tests 
for item non response bias are shown in Table III. 
TABLE II 
CHI-SQUARE AND MEANS TESTS OF UNIT NONRESPONSE 
BIAS BE'IWEEN SURVEY RESPONDENTS 
AND NONRESPONDENTS 
Variable Calculated Relpoadeota NCllli'OipllDdaata Calculated 
Oli-taqU&R Mean Meu l..,..tillic 
Farm size 66.55 318.81 391.47 3.69 
CRP Acre~ 60.70 92.19 120.99 4.66 
Bid Amounl 68.76 56.89 52.15 -7.63 
Lee• 1665.79 3.40 3.33 .(), 17 
Cooaervatioo 3013.44 •• •• 
Wheat Rue 452.49 25.66 38.72 4.19 
Com Bue 361.51 11.60 12.22 0.~ 
Barley Sue 1273.33 6.78 11.47 2.34 
Rice Sue 1919.00 0.01 0.0) 0.64 
Sorrbum Buc 579. IS 6.96 7.75 0.81 
Upland Bue 801.91 3.90 4.29 0.36 
Oat.s Base 558.33 3.62 4.88 2.44 
Wheal Yield 256.34 32.21 30.48 -4.S4 
Com Yield 348.15 86.65 78.29 -5.55 
Barley Yidd 855.35 39.46 38.18 -1.97 
Race Yaeld 1919.00 4166.00 3.580.00 N/A 
Sorrbum Y idd 677.92 46.65 44.81 -1.48 
Upland Yield 649.64 356.25 3S2.10 .(). 18 
Oats Yield 426.79 50.79 47.30 -.5.19 
1Mean.a wei,tlled by CRP Krea 
~ ean.a DOt calculated on total coaaervataon pncucea 
Note: For OU--.quare: df • 9: a = .10, X" = 14.6837; a • .OS, X2 .. 16.919 
Results of Tw<tlirnit Tobit Models for Data Imputation 
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During the estimation process some problems arose. Pint, the variance of the 
cumulative distribution function was very small. This is good in the sense that the 
loa-likelihood function will return a set of unbiased estimators which have a very low 
TABLE Ill 
MEANS TESTS OF ITEM NONRESPONSE BIAS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS 
WITH PLANS FOR CRP ACRES VS. RESPONDENTS WITHOUT 
PLANS FOR CRP ACRES 
f.lan.s NQ flill$ Calculated 
Variable Mean Mean Variance' t-statistic 
Farm size 369.90 285.53 27.36 3.08 
CRP acres 103.56 85.02 6.70 2.77 
Rent 55.55 57.53 0.74 -2.67 
Wheat Base 28.87 23.58 3.33 1.59 
Com Base 13.23 10.33 1.42 2.04 
Barley Base 9.03 5.89 1.81 1.74 
Sorghum Base 8.05 5.94 1.58 1.33 
Upland Base 4.69 3.12 1.37 1.15 
Oats Base 4.06 3.56 0.64 0.78 
Native Grass2 54.38 46.62 5.02 1.54 
Introduced Grass2 32.22 19.51 4.48 2.84 
Trees2 6.54 6.02 1.27 0.41 
1Pooled variance estimate 
'Conservation practices 
variance. But, the small variance of the cumulative distribution function repeatedly 
caused the log-likelihood function to be zero. Since some observations were outside 
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of three standard deviations from the mean these were assigned a probability of zero. 
Therefore, the data, including the variance estimate was rescaJed to avoid iterations 
within a singular Hessian. Even with these adjustments, the computer program in 
GAUSS seemed to search for the maximum of the likelihood function ouuide the 
relevant range. This was overcome by changing the algonthm u~"<i in the iteration 
process to finally converge to a set of estimators which maximized the log-likelihood 
function. 
Complete results of the estimated model uSt.'Xi for data imputation of unit 
nonrespondents are shown in Table IV. The results show that s1x of the seven 
independent variables are significantly different from 1cro. Only the percent of the 
total farm in CRP was insignificant. The indcpcndt•nt variables CRP. RENT, and 
TREEPCT show exceptional explanatory power (p-valuc of .(XX)()). The remaining 
variables, mcludmg EROSIONB. Sl.T, and NATVPCT, arc significant at the .05 
level. The signs of the parameter estimates arc consistent with expectations. 
If a greater proportion of the total farm was enrolled in the CRP (SIZEPCT) 
the contract holder typically plans to resume production on a lower percent of the 
CRP acreage. This is consistent w1th the theory that many older producers used the 
CRP with the annual rental payment to begin retirement. The signs on variables 
which relate to the value of the land enrolled in the CRP ind1cate that productive 
capacity will influence the decision to return land to crop production as hypothesized. 
Also, as expected TREEPCT 1s negative indicating the higher the proportion of CRP 
land planterl in trees the lower the rate of rccropping will be. The sign on 
NA TVPCT, the number of acres planted to nat1ve grass, is positive indicating that 
CRP acres in native grass are more likely to be returned to crop production. This has 
implications for both livestock and grain markets, since it is assumerl this land would 
be used to graze livestock. 
TABLE IV 
1WD-UMIT TOBIT MODEL OF RECROPPING RATE 
USING ONLY NONSAMPLE INFORMATION 
AS REGRESSORS 
Parameter Standard 
Variable Estimate Error t-ratio Probability > ltl 
CONSTANT -103.51 32.58 -3.18 0.00 
SIZEPCI' -7.94 14.74 -0.54 0.29 
CRP 0.16 0.04 4.50 0.00 
RENT 1.95 0.35 5.51 0.00 
EROSIONB -1.00 0.39 -2.53 0.01 
SLT 9.05 5.52 1.64 0.05 
NATVPCT 33.28 12.69 2.62 0.00 
TREEPCT -100.01 21.05 -4.75 0.00 
VARIANCE 1.23 0.07 16.59 0.00 
724 observations used in estimation 
Mean of log-likelihood -2.29 
The results of the model used to impute data for item nonrespondents are 
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shown in Table V. These results show seven of the fifteen independent variables are 
significant at the .05 level. Compared to the model for unit nonrespondents, RENT, 
SLT, and NATVPCf show reduced explanatory power. The variable SIZEPCT has 
increased power, but is still not significant at .~. Several variables obtained from 
the survey data are useful in explaining the rate of recropping. These include the use 
of CRP payments to buy land (LANDBUY), current market value of CRP land 
(LANDV AL), the age of the producer (OLDER), and the percent of total income 
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TABLE V 
1WO-UMIT TOBIT MODEL OF RECROPPING RATE 
CONDITIONAL ON SAMPLE AND 
NONSAMPLE INFORMATION 
Parameter Standard 
Variable Estimate Error t-ratio Probability > It I 
CONSTANT -5.97 34.15 -0.18 0.43 
SIZEPCT -14.43 l.~i. 57 -0.93 0.18 
CRP 0.10 0.03 2.98 0.00 
RENf 0.51 0.37 1.38 0.08 
EROSIONB -0.55 0.43 -1.30 0.09 
SLT 7.39 5.63 I. 31 0.09 
NATVPCT 15.25 12.82 1.19 0.12 
TREEPCf -118.37 22.46 -5.27 0.00 
LANDBUY 9.93 3.85 2.58 0.01 
HAY 2.50 2.35 1.07 0.14 
LANDVAL 0.07 0.02 4.57 0.00 
OWNOP 1.77 6.18 0.29 0.39 
OLDER -25.12 11.02 -2.28 0.01 
LIVEINC -0.78 0.20 -3.90 0.00 
CROPFARM 19.57 12.61 1.55 0.06 
OFFFARM -0.50 0.16 -3.10 0.00 
VARIANCE 1.04 0.07 15.85 0.00 
560 observations used in estimation 
Mean of log-likelihood = -2.37 
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earned from non-farm sources (OFFF ARM). Several others are significant at the . lO 
level. The signs of the parameter estimates are consistent with the exprctations used 
to specify the model. The signs of parameters also used in the previous estimation 
were unchanged indicating the model is fairly robust. The influence of several 
variables from the survey data, tested implicitly by this model. suggest some 
interesting implications. 
LANDBUY shows a positive relationship to the rate of recropping. This may 
indicate that some producers used the CRP to expand their operation with the 
intention of producing more grain rather than permanently retiring marginal land. 
The primary function of the farming operation will influence the post-CRP 
land use decision. This is indicated by the negative relationship between UVEINC. 
the percent of income earned from livestock cnterpnscs. and the rate of recropping. 
In addiuon. the positive coefficient on CROPFARM mdicatcs that if the primary 
source of income is from grain production a higher proponion of CRP land will be 
returned to crop production. The theory that the CRP was used by some older 
producers is strengthened by the negative relationship between OLDER and the rate 
of recropping. Willingness to extend the CRP contract if haying or grazing is 
allowed (HAY) is positively related to the percent of CRP land returning to crop 
production. Although the relationship is not extremely significant this shows the 
influence CRP contract expiration may have on both livestock and grain markets. 
The results of the weighted mean of recropping rate adjusted for unit and item 
nonresponse bias is 48.2 percent. Osborn used a weighted mean without adjusting for 
nonresponse bias to predict 52.7 percent of the land enrolled in the Conservation 
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Reserve would be returned to crop pnxtuction. Although these results at first do not 
appear large, the difference is nearly one million acres returning to crop pnxtuction if 
all contracts expire. The smaJl difference between this prediction and Osborn's 
prediction is a result of the two sources of bias acting to caned each other out. 
Summary and Implications 
The purpose of this research was to predict the proportion of CRP land which 
producers intend to return to crop pnxtuction when contracts expire. Based on the 
results of means tests, previous attempts to predict recropping were flawed in 
assuming valid survey data from the 1990 survey conducted by the Soil and Water 
Conservation Society. This research corrects the survey data for two sources of 
nonresponse bias. Data imputation, using a two-limit Tobit model, is used to predict 
the rate of recropping for both unit nonrespondents and item nonrespondents 
separately. After adjusting for nonresponse bias the weighted mean of recropping is 
calculated. The results of this research indicate that producers intend to return 48.2 
percent of the land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States 
to crop pnxtuction when contracts expire. 
It seems reasonable, based on the results, that much of the marginal land in 
the CRP may remain idle in grass to meet conservation compliance requirements or 
annual set-aside provisions for government program participation. This land may also 
be kept in vegetative cover under the normal flexed acres or 0-S0/92 programs. 
Although the government has alternatives other than letting all CRP contracts 
expire, the proportion of CRP acres which will be returned to crop production if CRP 
contracts are not extended will have important implications on the predicted impacts 
on grain and livestock prices, the environment, and government costs. 
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GRAIN MARKETS AFTER THE CONSERVATION 
RESERVE PROORAM 
Introduction 
The overriding objective of long term land retirement programs has been to 
reduce soil erosion on marginal cropland. Many researchers, producers, and 
agribusiness managers maintain that all land retirement programs have an implicit 
objective of supply control. The most recent long term land retirement program, the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), gives producers an annual rental payment and 
cost-sharing in exchange for establishing a vegetative cover on marginal land. The 
CRP has reduced available cropland in the United States by nearly 34 million acres 
under the first nine signup periods (1986-1990). Among these are 22 million acres 
with historical crop acreage base (CAB) which will most likely be retained upon 
contract expiration. Ten million acres have wheat base and another 3.8 million acres 
have corn base. These acres could potentially produce 288 million bushels of wheat 
and 340 million bushels of corn (Osborn, Llacuna, and Linsenbigler). The purpose of 
this research is to determine the impacts the expiration of Conservation Reserve 




Most research conducted on the price impacts of the Conservation Reserve 
Program has concentrated on the impacts during the CRP. In comparison, no current 
work has attempted to analyze the impacts of CRP land returning to crop production. 
However, these earlier studies may be helpful in determining the changes brought 
about by contract expiration. 
Many estimates of commodity price impacts were made during the 
implementation of the CRP. These estimates ranged from a 1.5 percent increase in 
the price of wheat to a 19 percent increase in all grain prices (faylor; Hertel and 
Preckel). 
In 1990 Dicks, Ray, and Sanders used POLYSIM, an econometric policy 
simulation model, to determine the past impacts government programs, including the 
CRP, had on farm prices. The current research also uses POLYSIM to predict a 
baseline set of prices without the effects of CRP contract expiration. However, this 
analysis goes beyond Dicks, Ray, and Sanders by using RASS, a linear programming 
model, to predict changes in harvested acres, variable costs, and government 
participation due to changing government programs in the year following CRP 
contract expiration. These changes are used by POLYSIM to predict changes in 
production and price due to the incremental impacts of CRP contract expiration. 
Despite these predictions, price levels for most agricultural commodities have 
not increased significantly during the CRP. This may be attributed to lower annual 
set-aside requirements on crop acreage base over the last several years. For example, 
the ARP for wheat in 1985 was 27.5 percent of base. Currently, the ARP on wheat 
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is zero. In effect, the government has used a shon-term policy mstrument to balance 
some of the effects of a long-term policy. 
Market outlook for grains depends on expected production. The assumptions 
and facts used in previous studies of price Impacts due to land entering the CRP no 
longer apply. Clearly, with the first CRP contracts set to expire in 1996, commodity 
outlook must include the land usc intentions of CRP contract holders to estimate the 
commodity price impacts of CRP contract expiration. 
A major unknown for analysts and agribusiness dectsion makers over the next 
few years is the extent to which CRP acreage will return to crop production. The 
fate of land enrolled in the CRP as contracts exptre has been the toptc of several 
recent studies. In 1990, the Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS) conducted 
a national survey of CRP contract holders, in part to determine the rate of land 
returning to crop production. l~orty two percent of respondents indicated they would 
return some CRP acreage to crop production (Nowak et al. ). Osborn weighted 
responses to this survey by the number of acres controlled by each respondent to find 
crop production would resume on 52.7 percent of CRP acres. However, these 
estimates were made based on the survey data without testing the data for bias. 
Recent work by Garrison et al. has shown the SWCS survey data suffered 
from two sources of nonresponse bias. A two-limit Tobit model was used for 
response imputation to adjust the data. After correcting for nonresponse bias the 
mean of recropping weighted by CRP acres was calculated. Results indicate 48.2 
percent of the CRP land enrolled in the first nine signups will be returned to crop 
production. These recropping predictions are incorporated into market outlook in 
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order to predict most likely changes in production and prices of wheat and com in the 
post-CRP era. 
Procedure 
Producer intentions represente.d by the SWCS survey arc for land enrolled in 
the Conservation Reserve from 1986 to 1990. For this reason. the analysis will focus 
on the expiration of contracts entered in this r.x=riod although subsequent signups have 
been offere.d. Enrollment eligibility is based on land characteristics including land 
capability class and soil loss tolerance. The most highly erodible land was enrolled in 
the first signups, so it will be the first eligible to return to production. A-. contract\ 
expire, less fragile land will be eligible. The fourth signup offered incentives 
commonly referre.d to as "com bonus" to entice prcxlucers from the com belt to enroll 
in the CRP. For these reasons the market outlook for wheat and corn will be forecast 
by year from 1996 through 20CK). 
Although the government has alternatives other than allowing all CRP 
contracts to expire, the analysis is conducted assuming the Conservation Reserve will 
be terminate.d in the 1995 farm legislation. However, the analysis considers two 
alternative proportions of land returning to crop production. 
First, a baseline market forecast will be made assuming all CRP contracts arc 
extended. From this, changes in the wheat and corn markets are predicted assuming 
first that 100 percent of base and then, under the most likely scenario, 48.2 percent of 
base acres for all crops enrolled in CRP will return to production. Past land use 
should indicate the most profitable land use, and therefore, the analysis assumes only 
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land which bas established crop acn::qe base will return to production. It should be 
noted that this analysis does not consider the 12 million acres which do not have crop 
acreage base. Therefore, impacts due to land returning to soybean production are not 
explicitly estimated. Although the characteristics of the land enrolled in each signup 
differ, there is little difference in the average productivity of land between sign ups 
(Osborn, Uacuna, and Unsenbigler). Therefore, all land returning to crop production 
is assumed to be of average productivity for the production area where it returns. 
Under these assumptions and scenarios the impacts of CRP contract expiration on the 
production and prices of wheat and com are predicted for each year of contract 
expiration. 
The analysis is accomplished using a comprehensive simulation model, 
POL YSYS, developed at Oklahoma State University and the University of Tennessee. 
POL YSYS combines linear programming, econometric simulation, and Input-Output 
models to determine the impacts of policy changes (Dicks, Ray, and Ugarte). To 
determine production and price impacts of CRP contract expiration only the 
econometric component is used fully. The linear programming capabilities of 
POL YSYS are bypassed even though the LP component is partially employed. Each 
component and the methods used to conduct this analysis are described. 
POLYSIM (Policy Simulator) is the econometric component used to estimate 
annual supply and demand, as well as prices for major U.S. commodities. POLYSIM 
uses a baseline set of data over the analysis period in order to predict prices and 
production (Dicla, Ray, and Ugarte). For this analysis, the Food and Agriculture 
Policy Re3earch Institute (F APRI) baseline assumptions (November 1992) are uJed to 
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construct the supply and demand components of POLYSIM used to predict production 
and price. However, this baseline includes an estimate of CRP land returning to crop 
production. For the purpose of this analysis the FAPRI baseline has been adjusted to 
represent complete extension of all CRP contracts. The FAPRI baseline originally 
assumed 60 percent of the crop base acres would return to crop production. These 
acres are removed from the baseline scenario. POL YSIM uses percentage changes 
from baseline values and supply and demand price elasticities, capturing cross-price 
relationships, to estimate the effects of changes in farm policy (Dicks, Ray, and 
Ugarte). The initial simulation using the modified FAPRI baseline provides a 
measure of the production and price changes that could be expected if the CRP is 
extended, with none of the land returning to production. The estimates of price for 
each year of analysis are incorporated into RASS (Resource Allocation Summary 
Sheet), the second component of POLYSYS, to predict changes in harvested acreage 
as CRP land returns to crop production. 
RASS is an interregional linear programming model which estimates the 
expected distribution of crop production activities across 105 production areas of the 
contiguous United States. RASS combines variable cost, yield, price, and acreage for 
each crop in each of the production areas. Variables for each crop are summarized in 
a separate spreadsheet and the spreadsheets arc linked through an objective function to 
maximize net returns. An input sheet is used to provide changes in each of the 
variables to represent pre-planting expectations (Dicks, Ray, and Uprte). For this 
analysis, changes in the acrea&e available for crop production due to yearly CRP 
contract expiration in each production area were made in RASS to predict the change 
1n harvestt.-d acreage. Th1s prt.xhction IS then us.t.•d u1 POLYSIM tl' support 
predictions of supply. demand. and market pnces in e~Kh year. 
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RASS and POL YSIM are linked in a rt.'\.·ur~I\C framework wh1ch us.t.·~ the 
forccastwg abilities of POLYSIM to pnmde C'<pt-cted pnces. costs. and y•e!Js. 
Based on these expectations. RASS determines croppwg actiVllles for all regwns and 
aggregates them to a national lrvcl. The output from RASS '" then '\uppl•cd to 
POLYSIM to estimate the pnce response a<>so .. :tatt.'d wtth the csttmatcd levds of 
harvested acreage. 
For th1s analysis the c'pccted pnn.~. vanahk co\1\, and national program 
acreage for l'Nt1 obtained from the adJU'>tcJ FAPRI ha'>l'IIIH.' 111 POI.YSIM arc 
'>UpplicJ to RASS. The change~ Hl available crop acn:~tgc 111 t.'<Kh produrtHm arc.a due 
to contract expiration under each ;;.cenario for 1996 arc made Ill RASS. RA.SS 1s then 
U'l.Cd to prcd1ct changes in harve\ted acreage under the alternative <>cenarim. RASS 
also predicts changes 1n nat10nal y1clds. CO\! of productiOn. and cornrnod•ty pro~ram 
part1cipallon that will occur as a rc<;ult of changes in land u\C. Thc'>t.' percentage 
changes for each crop arc then provided to POLYSIM to e\timatc the tmpact'> of CJ<P 
c'p1ration on production and prices of wheat and corn for 199t1. Using thc\C 
prediCtions. the 1997 price under the alternative sccnano\ of renopp•ng for each crop 
IS forecast by POLYSIM. The procedure IS repeated under each land-u\C ~cnano to 
obtain the impacts of contract expiratiOn in 1997 along w1th a forecast for 199R. Thl<> 
recursive procedure is repeated for each year from 1996 through 2()(X) to detcrmmc 
the yearly impacts of CRP contract expiration of the first nmc signups. 
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Results 
As CRP land returns to production, price and production diverge from the 
baseline estimates generated by POLYSJM. Because predictions are based on 
deviations from a set of baseline assumptions affecting supply and demand in each 
year, price docs not consistently decline or production increase in absolute terms over 
time. Rather, price diverges from the baseline prediction as land returns to crop 
production over time. The impacts of Conservation Reserve Program contract 
expiration on the market outlook for com and wheat are discussed separately. 
Predicted com production under the alternative scenarios is shown in Table 
VI. The percentage changes in com production grow steadily farther from the 
baseline predicted in POL YSIM in each year of contract expiration. By 2000, 
production is expected to be 2% higher than the baseline under the 48.2 percent 
scenario, and 5% higher under the 100 percent scenario. 
As CRP contracts expire, the price of com steadily diverges from the baseline 
price predicted by POLYSIM. The impacts on com price for each year of contract 
expiration are shown in Table VII. The price impact of contract expiration in 1996 is 
minimal. The biggest year-to-year impact on com prices is in 1997, the year 
contracts for land enrolled under the com bonus expire. The 1997 baseline price is 
$2.39/bu. The price under the 48.2 percent CRP recropping scenario is $2.35/bu., a 
I. 7% decline from the predicted baseline, and the price under the 100 percent 
recropping scenario is $2.45/bu., a 5% decline. The results for predicted com price 
and production deviations from the baseline are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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TABLE VI 
PREDICTED CORN PRODUCfiON DEVIATIONS 
FROM BASELINE, 1996-2000 
Baseline 48.2 Percent 100 Percent 
Year (Million bushels) (~) (~) 
1996 8822.2 0.10 0.19 
1997 8887.7 l.36 2.83 
1998 8919.0 1.67 3.46 
1999 9013.5 1.98 4.14 
2<XX> 9140.3 2.23 4.64 
TABLE VII 
PREDICfED CORN PRICE DEVIATIONS 
FROM BASELINE, 1996-2000 
Baseline 48.2 Percent 100 Percent 
Year ($/bu) (%} (%} 
1996 2.48 0 -0.40 
1997 2.39 -1.67 -2.93 
1998 2.38 -1.68 -3.78 
1999 2.45 -2.04 -4.48 
2000 2.58 -2.32 -5.04 
Table vm indicates that in 2000 wheat production will be 6% above the 
baseline under the 48.2 percent scenario, and 12.5% above the bueline under the 100 
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PREDICfED WHEAT PRODUCfiON DEVIATIONS 
FROM BASELINE, 1996-2000 
Baseline 48.2 Percent 100 Percent 
(Million bushels) <"> <"> 
2535.4 0.31 0.65 
2499.2 2.36 4.95 
2495.0 4.09 8.54 
2461.1 5.11 10.68 
2464.9 5.98 12.50 
ss 
percent scenario. While com price does not show real decline from the baseline until 
1997, Table IX shows the price of wheat is expected to drop 0.5% from the 
POLYSIM baseline in 1996 under the 48.2 percent scenario, and 1% under the 100 
percent scenario. Wheat price consistently diverges from the baseline until in 2000 it 
is 7% below the baseline under the 48.2 percent scenario, and 13% below under the 
100 percent scenario. The results for predicted wheat price and production deviations 
from the baseline are illustrated in Figure 3. 
The price impacts estimated in this analysis due to increased wheat and com 
production suggest a near-unitary demand elasticity, since percentage increases in 
production are nearly matched by percentage decreases in price. This would be an 
inappropriate representation of agricultural markets in general. However, the 
elasticity is a long-run estimate of both the wheat and corn markets covering a period 
S6 
TABLE IX 
PREDICfED WHEAT PRICE DEVIATIONS 
FROM BASEUNE, 1996-2()(X) 
Baseline 48.2 Percent 100 Percent 
Year ($/bu) (~) (~) 
1996 3.67 -0.54 -1.09 
1997 3.75 -3.20 -6.93 
1998 3.65 -5.48 -9.58 
1999 3.81 -6.30 -11.29 
2()(X) 4.04 -7.18 -12.87 
of five years. It takes into account the cumulative impacts of CRP contract expiration 
including increasing grain stocks and changing cross-price effects. Thus, the results 
imply elasticities within the range of those historically estimated for agricultural 
commodities. 
Summary and Implications 
The results clearly suggest that CRP contract expiration will influence the 
price of wheat and com. Under the most likely scenario, based on past production 
practices and producer intentions, 48.2 percent of the base acres enrolled in the CRP 
will return to production. Under this scenario, price of com declines by more than 
2~ from baseline by 2()(X), and the price of wheat declines by more than 7~. 
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Figure 3. Predicted Wheal Price and Production. Deviations from the Baseline Under 48.2% and 100% Recropping 
Scenarios. 1996-~000 
Declining farm prices for wheat and com may cause declining net farm 
returns. Also, government program cost.s for these and other crops may increase 
unless the Secretary of Agriculture uses discretionary controls to la:ep the loan rate 
higher in 2<XXl. These implications, along with many others, must be considered in 




Dicks, Michael, DaryU Ray, and Larry D. Sanders. ·conservation Title Impacts on 
the Great Plains. • Current Fvm Economics 63(March 1990):21-30. 
Dicks, M. R., D. E. Ray, and D. Ugarte. • An Integrated System for Analyzing 
Agricultural Policy• working paper, Oklahoma State University, 1991. 
Hertel, Thomas W. and Paul V. Preckel. •Extending the Conservation Reserve: 
What Effect on Commodity Prices and Budget Costs?" Journal of Soil and 
Water Conservation 43(1): 106-108. 
Nowak, Peter J., Max Schnepf, and Roy Barnes. When Conservation Reserve 
Proeram Contracts Expire ... , Soil and Water Conservation Society, 1991. 
Osborn, Tim. Summa()' Analysis of Post-CRP Land Usc Intentions in the Great 
Plains. Selected paper, 1992 annual meetings of the American Aericultural 
Economics Association, Baltimore, MD., August 1992. 
Osborn, Tim, Felix Llacuna, and Michael Linscnbigler. The Conservation Reserve 
ProJram: Enrollment Statistics for Sienup Periods 1-9 and Fiscal Year 1989. 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service 
Statistical Bulletin no. 811, July 1990. 
Taylor, Robert C. •supply Control Aspects of the Conservation Reserve. • Journal 
of Soil and Water Conservation, 1990 . 
.S9 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECfS OF THE CONSERVATION RESERVE 
PROGRAM ON MERCHANDISING MARGINS 
OF ELEVATORS 
Background 
Economic conditions and farm programs in the 1980s and 1990s have changed 
the economic environment in which grain elevators conduct business. Land 
retirement programs in the mid-1980s reduced grain production and increased 
competition among elevators for available supplies. The largest land retirement 
program in recent years is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), with 
approximately 37 million acres of cropland enrolled to date. 
Many elevator managers, particularly those in areas with high CRP 
participation, believe that the CRP program has contributed substantially to their 
financial stress. In Oklahoma, for example, CRP enrollment for several counties 
exceeds 25 percent of the total cropland in the county. In a recent survey of 
Oklahoma and Texas cooperative elevator managers, sixty percent of those surveyed 
indicated the CRP had a negative impact on the elevator (Sanders, Kenkel, and 
Smith). By diverting cropland away from production, the implicit supply control 
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objective of the CRP may have caused lower profits and tighter marketing margins for 
country wheat elevators. 
Although many factors have contributed to the problems facing grain elevators, 
such as reduced grain exports, heavy borrowing and expansion in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and the overall weak farm economy, an evaluation of the effects of the 
CRP will provide useful information as the 1995 farm legislation is debated. 
Although much research has attempted to evaluate the environmental and budgetary 
impacts of CRP, little research has examined the impacts on agribusiness firms. 
Despite the changing structure of the industry, grain elevators still mainrain an 
important role in marketing basic commodities. Country grain elevators remain a 
vital transfer and pricing mechanism in the marketing system. 
This paper focuses on the effect of CRP on elevator profits by assessing the 
impacts of CRP on elevator merchandising margins. A theoretical model is developed 
for grain elevators performing grain merchandising services. An empirical model is 
formulated for assessing the impacts of CRP on a grain elevator in a major wheat-
producing county in Oklahoma. 
Theoretical Framework 
Less grain in the marketing system could shift market centers away from small 
country devators. In periods of tight supply, convenience yield, associated with 
immediate delivery, increases. With less grain to be stored, country elevators would 
likely fmd il unprofitable to store their own grain under a stora&e hedge. More 
significantly, the lower volume of grain would mean decreased storage revenues 
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received from producers and government storage programs. One way the elevator 
could improve its storage volume and revenues is to reduce its storage charges. 
Lower storage charges may make it profitable for producers to contract with the 
elevator for storage services, but they will reduce the margin received by the elevator 
for its storage activity. 
The merchandising margin is defined as the difference between the price 
received from next-in-line (NIL) buyers and the price paid to farmers (Tomek and 
Robinson). Reduced production due to CRP may have forced country elevators to 
increase the bid price offered to fanners in order to maintain the volume of grain 
merchandised to cover a portion of fixed costs. Higher bid prices are offered to 
entice local producers to reduce on-farm storage and to refrain from selling to 
competing elevators. By definition, as the bid price is increased the merchandising 
margin would be reduced unless a proportional increase was offered by NIL buyers. 
Profitability is a measure of the efficiency of the business organization in 
agricultural elevators (Christy and Zapata). Since price margins constitute a 
management objective and affect the profitability of the elevator, it should prove 
useful to observe the association between margins and land retirement programs. 
Virtually no rcxarch has addressed the impacts of the Conservation Reserve 
Program on marketing margins of grain elevators. The hypothesis that the supply 
control objective of the CRP has forced elevators to reduce storage and merchandising 
margins to maintain volume has the potential to determine the impacts on profitability 
of elevators both during and after the CRP. The theoretical framework of several 
sources will provide a useful guide in analyzing these impacts. 
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Most research of marketing margins has focused on the farm-retail price 
sprt2d. Describing the effects of price uncertainty on margins of U. S. flour mills, 
Brorsen et al. solved a utility maximization problem. The marketing margin was 
expressed as a function of wealth, input prices, price uncertainty, and output. 
Although prioe uncertainty is beyond the scope of the present research, this research 
provides a basis for the analysis of the marketing margin received by an intermediate 
firm within the marketing system. 
Gardner, in his groundlaying work on margins, defines an equilibrium price 
margin as the difference between retail and farm price, P. - P •. • For a grain 
elevator, price margins (M) are defined as the difference between price received from 
next-in-line (NlL) buyers' (Pa) and price paid to producers (P, ). 
(10) Pa-P,= M 
Analyzing the elasticity of the farm-retail price ratio, Gardner shows how an 
exogenous force which decreases the supply of agricultural input (i. e. wheat) 
decreases the marketing margin. In addition, Gardner concludes an increase in the 
supply of marketing services would cause tighter margins. Under the CRP, the 
supply of marketing services has increased relative to demand due to an increased 
convenience yield associated with immediate delivery of wheat. 
The marketing margin may be determined by the difference between the 
equilibrium prices occurring at the intersection of primary supply and derived demand 
COardaer defiael~eVenl meuute1 of lbe price lpR'*i betwoeo retail aod farm price. In lhi• defanition, 
P. is abe rdliJ price of food IDd P. is abe firm price of ..,ncuJtural output. 
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and the intersection of derived supply and primary demand (Tomek and Robinson). 
As the price of wheat increases in deficit processing areas primary suppliers (farmers) 
may bypass grain elevators so that derived supply (elevator volume) decreases 
resulting in a higher equilibrium price between derived supply and primary demand. 
Tomek and Robinson also define the marketing margin as the collective price 
of marketing services which is determined in the market for those services. As 
previously discussed, the CRP has caused a lower demand for marketing services 
resulting in a relative surplus supply. 
Wohlgenant and Mullen, as well as Gardner, define the supply of marketing 
services as a function of input prices and output prices. The quantity of marketing 
services is defined as: 
(11) Q, = j(P,r) 
where: 
Qm is the supply of marketing services, 
P is the price paid to the elevator by NIL buyers, and 
r is a vector of input prices including the farm price of wheat. 
Assuming this function is positively sloped, the price of marketing services would 
decrease as demand is decreased, resulting in tighter margins (Tomek and Robinson). 
By inverting this supply function and solving for P - r1, where r1 is the farm 




M is the marketing margin and 
r2, ... ,r. are other marketing input prices. 
The empirical aggregation of the supply of marketing services would be 
difficult or impossible. However, if it is assumed that the quantity of wheat produced 
(Q,) is a suitable proxy for the quantity of marketing services (Q.J, such that Q. = Q,, 
Q, may be substituted. 
The quantity of wheat produced is a function of the price received by farmers 
(P,), farm input costs (C), price of competing enterprises (Pc), and federal policies 
which influence land use and the intensity of production (G) 
(13) 
Substituting (13) into (12) yields margin as a function of production, input 




This provides a theoretical foundation for including policy variables in the 
specification to explain the variation in marketing margins. Although derived using a 
proxy the theoretical relationship between the quantity of wheat produced, elevator 
volume, and marketing margins is easily comprehended. 
Gardner concluded that changes in both supply and demand affect the 
marketing margin. Therefore, the impacts of the CRP on margins could only be fully 
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analyzed using simultaneous market equations. However. the purpose of this research 
is to determine the structural specification of the marketing margin. Due to data 
limitations a quasi-reduced form model of marketing margins is used to gauge the 
impacts of the CRP. In the next section the impacts of a government program (i.e., 
CRP) which reduces production intensity on elevator merchandising margins is 
investigated. 
In a competitive market it has been shown that the behavior of cooperatives 
and commercial elevators are identical (Sexton, Wilson, and Wann). Consider a 
competitive elevator providing one service, merchandising. It is assumed that grain 
purchased from farmers is sold directly to NIL buyers. That is, all grain must be 
taken out of storage at the end of the period, so beginning and ending inventory is 
zero. Risk and liquidity constraints limit elevators from storing the grain for long 
periods of time. Thus, the total quantity of grain marketed by the elevator (QJ 
equals the quantity purchased from farmers and sold to NIL buyers in the current 
period (Q,). The model described above is applied to a cooperative wheat elevator in 
Oklahoma. 
Empirical Model 
The merchandising margin received by the local elevator is determined by 
local supply and demand conditions. Since wheat is an export-based commodity, 
conditions in the world market directly affect the demand for wheat at the elevator. 
These effects are assumed to be captured in the Gulf- Kansas City basis (Tilley and 
Campbell). Likewise, the biological nature of production, producer decisions, and 
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government programs impact the supply of wheat available to the elevator. The 
purpose of the empirical model is to assess the impact of CRP on elevator marketing 
margins after allowing for other factors. 
The merchandising margin is assumed to be a function of the price received by 
the elevator, the nearby Gulf - Kansas City basis. acres enrolled in the CRP, 
mandatory government program set-aside requirements. and price of feeder cattle. 
Therefore, the model is specified as: 
where M = merchandising margin 
Pr = price received by farmers 
BASIS = July basis 
FEEDER = price of feeder cattle 
ARP = percentage set-aside requirement 
CRP = acres in CRP 
Data used are harvest-time (June 20) data on price received and merchandising 
margins for a cooperative elevator in Oklahoma for the period 1975 through 1990. 
Futures prices are June 20 prices for Kansas City Hard Red Winter wheat contracts. 
Gulf prices are June 20 cash bids for Hard Red Winter wheat at the Gulf of Mexico. 
The dependent variable, merchandising margin, represents the actual merchandising 
margin received by the elevator on June 20 of each year. The margin is calculated as 
the difference between the Gulf bid and the local bid on this date, less transportation 
costs from the elevator to the Gulf port. 
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The price received (PR) is the Gulf bid less transponation cost. Unless the 
elevator's merchandising margin is a constant absolute markup over time, the margin 
should be positively related to price roceived. 
Nearby basis is assumed to reflect storage costs, the level of export 
commitments relative to free stocks. and futures market liquidity ("filley and 
Campbell). The nearby basis is the difference between the Gulf b1d and the price of 
the nearby futures contract. The July contract is used to calculate the nearby basis. 
Since the analysis focuses on the margin on June 20. the most important contract 
month is July. 
A high price for feeder cattle (FEEDER) may entice some central Oklahoma 
producers to leave stocker calves on wheat pasture beyond the jointing stage of 
production. This allows for better weight gains for the calves. but destroys any 
harvest potential for the wheal. Producers may also graze out winter wheat pasture as 
a result of participation in the 0/92 or 50/92 program. In either case the intensity of 
wheat production is reduced in the elevator's trade area. The value of feeder cattle is 
based on the average price in March for 700-800 pound steers at the Oklahoma City 
Stockyards for each year of analysis. Stocker cattle would normally be taken off 
wheat pasture during March (before the jointing stage) while still weighing close to 
700 pounds. A prolonged grazing period would put cattle in the 700-800 pound 
range. It is expected that as the March price of 700-800 pound steers increases, 
producers have more incentive to pasture the wheat rather than harvest it, and the 
local elevator will bid a higher price to improve the relative profitability to the farmer 
for producing wheat. The higher bid would cause the margin to decrease. 
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The supply control objective of government farm policy affects the intensity of 
wheat production and the supply of grain available in the elevator's trade area. The 
number of acres enrolled in the CRP has reduced the wheat base acres available for 
production by nearly 10,000 acres in the elevator's trade area since implemented in 
1986. Acres participating in CRP in each year in the county where the elevator is 
located are taken from the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) 
national data tapes. The variable represents the summation of incremental reductions 
in wheat base due to enrollment in CRP. From 1975 through 1985 there was no 
Conservation Reserve Program, therefore, no reduction in wheat base occurred and 
the variable CRP is zero for this period. The mandatory set-aside percent for 
program participation is represented by ARP. Oklahoma had a participation rate in 
government programs of well over 90 percent over this period. 
The empirical model of elevator marketing margins is estimated with ordinary 
least squares. Preliminary results indicated that a significant time trend existed in the 
period. To correct for this, a trend variable was included in the set of independent 
variables used in estimation. Data for the variables MARGIN, PRICE, and BASIS 
were obtained from a cooperative elevator in central Oklahoma. The data for CRP 
represents the number of acres enrolled in the program in the county where the 
elevator is located. The data for CRP came from the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service national data base of CRP contracts. All other data were 
obtained from the Oklahoma Agricultural Statistical Service. 
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Results 
The results of the regression analysis show that the variables in the model 
explain 8S percent of the variation in the elevator margin (R2 = 0.85, adj. R2 = 
0.74) Three of the variables in the model show a significant relationship with the 
elevator margin at a .15 or higher significance level. The direction of the relationship 
between the margin and the independent variables was as expected with the exception 
of feeder cattle price, which was insignificant. A summary of the empirical results 









R2 = 0.85 
TABLE X 
Ol.S REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF FACTORS 
EXPLAINING ELEVA TOR MERCHANDISING 
MARGINS 
PARAMETER STANDARD P-VALUE 
ESTIMATE ERROR 
0.041587 0.113747 0.72 
0.129493 0.040429 0.01 
0.032585 0.161988 0.85 
-0.000010 0.000008 0.07 
-0.152743 0.223031 0.25 
0.001330 0.001849 0.25 
0.027994 0.01.562 0.03 
adj. R2 = 0.74 
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The significant positive coefficient on price suggests that the elevator 
merchandising margin is not a constant absolute markup, but is higher (larger margin) 
for higher wheat prices. The nearby basis was not a significant factor in explaining 
elevator margin. 
The value of feeder cattle seemingly shares a positive relationship with the 
elevator margin. This result is not expected since Oklahoma producers have the 
opportunity to graze out the wheat pasture rather than produce grain depending on the 
relative profitability of each enterprise. However, this coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
The results of the model suggest that government programs which reduce the 
intensity of production also reduce the margin of the local elevator. While an inverse 
relationship exists between the ARP and the margin the parameter estimate is near 
zero. However, the results of a one-tailed t-test of the significance of the parameter 
CRP suggest that the Conservation Reserve Program has significantly (at the 0.07 
level) affected elevator merchandising margins. Apparently, the intensity of wheat 
production has decreased sufficiently that the elevator has been forced to accept a 
smaller margin in order to maintain the volume necessary to cover fixed costs and 
profit. 
Summary and Implications 
The results of the regression analysis and the hypothesis test on the impact of 
the CRP on elevator margins suggest that the supply control objective of this land 
retirement program has burdened country elevators. These results add a new 
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dimension to the debate over the fate of the Conservation Reserve Program in the 
1995 farm legislation. The model used here to estimate the relationship between 
variables related to supply and demand and the elevator margin may be useful in 
predicting the margins and profitability of country elevators as CRP contracts begin to 
expire and some of this land returns to wheat production. 
The effect of CRP seems to be significant, but evaluation of the magnitude of 
those effects should wait for more precise estimates. Further research should expand 
on this model by including dynamics and considering other elevator activities, such as 
storage. Finally, these results have focused on a single elevator. More robust 
estimates will require consideration of a larger population of elevators. 
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SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Land use policies have been a prominent force in the development of 
agriculture. Early policies in the 1800s were focused on the expansion of agriculture, 
the country's primary economic industry. Environmental concerns, excess 
production. and maintaining the country's long run production capacity have become 
the driving force of land use policies in the 1900s. While erosion control continues to 
be the primary objective of land use policies, recent legislation carries supply control 
as a secondary objective. The most prominent eJ>ample of this kind of program is the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), mandated in the Food Security Act of 198.5. 
Nearly 34 million acres of highly erodible cropland in the United States has been 
idled in the CRP during the first nine signup periods from 1986 to 1990. 
As a producer enrolled land in the CRP, a proportional base acreage reduction 
occurred. Among the acres enrolled in the CRP are 10 million acres which have 
historical wheat base and 3.8 million acres of com base. These acres could produce 
nearly 288 million bushels of wheat and 342 million bushels of corn each crop year 
(Osborn, Llacuna, and LinsenbigJer). Removing these acres from production may 
have had large impacts on the grain marketing system by subjecting grain handlers 
and input suppliers to severe competitive pressures. 
74 
1S 
A major unknown for analysts. policy makers, and agribusiness decision 
makers over the next few years is the extent to which CRP acres will return to crop 
production. The purpose of this research is to determine the effect CRP contract 
expiration will have on the supply and demand for wheat in the United States and on 
marketing margins at country elevaton. 
This objective is met by accomplishing three specific objectives. The specific 
objectives of this research are: ( 1) determine the percent of CRP land which 
producers intend to return to crop production as contracts expire; (2) forecast the 
quantity of wheat produced and the subsequent price of wheat for each year from 
1996 through 2000 as CRP land returns to production; (3) determine the effect the 
Conservation Reserve Program has had on country elevator marketing margins and 
returns to storage and merchandising activities. The overall objective is met by 
combining the results of the three specific objectives to determine the direction of 
change in elevator margins. 
A summary of the research, implications, and suggestions for future research 
associated with each specific objective are discussed separately in the following 
sections. Some general implications and suggestions for further research are included 
in the closing section. 
Recropping Rates of CRP Acreage 
The first land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve will be eligible for 
production activities beginning in 1996. The land use intentions of contract holden 
are the primary factor in determining the how much CRP land will return to crop 
production. 
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The Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS) conducted a national survey 
of 2,739 contract holden through the ninth signup in 1990, in part to determine the 
post-CRP land use intentions of contract holders. Previous research which has 
utilized this data was flawed in assuming the survey data adequately represents the 
population of CRP contract holders. 
Chi-square and means tests show that the SWCS survey suffered from both 
unit and item nonresponse bias. Separate two-limit Tobit model specifications are 
used to impute the rate of recropping for nonrespondents to correct the survey data 
for each source of nonresponse bias. The mean of recropping rate weighted by acres 
enrolled is calculated from actual and imputed survey responses. 
The results of the two-limit Tobit models suggest some interesting implications 
from the factors which seem to influence land use intentions. A positive relationship 
exists between the percent of acres planted to native grass and the rate of recropping. 
Both livestock and grain producers have tended in the past to assume these acres 
would be used to graze livestock. However, the results show that this is not 
necessarily the case. Also, the results indicate that producers who enrolled a large 
percentage of their farm in the CRP do not plan to return as much of the land to crop 
production. Therefore, these acres may not be recropped immediately, but future 
tenants or land owners may decide otherwise. 
'The CRP may have also aided in the expansion of some crop producing farms 
by providing capital to producers who purchased more cropland. This expansion has 
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likely already been absorbed by the markets since no restrictions on using this land 
apply. However, contract holders who expanded operations under the CRP will 
return more acres to crop production. Also, the primary enterprise of the farming 
operation will influence the land use decision. Livestock producers will be returning 
less land to crops as crop producers return more. 
The results of the weighted mean of recropping show that 48.2 percent, or 17 
million acres, of the land in the CRP will return to crop production if contracts are 
not extended. However, the 1995 farm legislation will play a major role in 
determining the actual rate of recropping. Some producers expressed an interest in 
extending contracts for a reduced annual payment if haying or grazing is allowed. 
The nature of the survey data and the myriad of possible options to the government 
for extending the CRP make the results of this analysis somewhat uncertain. 
This analysis could be improved if a second survey, underway by the SWCS, 
employs a stratified sample so that the sample better represents the population and 
unit nonresponse bias is less likely. Also, if the question relating to post-CRP land 
use intentions is asked more appropriately item nonresponse bias may not occur. 
The results of the models used in data imputation suggest that some adjustment 
should be made for acres planted to trees. In addition, future research should account 
for land use alternatives such as flex acres, annual set aside, and underplanting 
provisions of recent farm legislation. Also, the impacts of conservation compliance 
should be estimated. The actual rate of recropping will depend on what action is 
taken by the government in the next farm legislation scheduled for 199.5. It is likely 
that the annual set-aside requirements (ARP) will be increased to counter falling 
prices expected when CRP contracts expire. 
Grain Markets After the CRP 
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The land use intentions of CRP contract holders is of critical concern to the 
agricultural industry. The rate of land returning to crop production will have 
ramifications on fann prices, net returns, and government program costs. The second 
objective of this research investigates the potential influence of CRP contract 
expiration on production and prices of wheat and corn in the United States. 
The analysis is conducted using POL YSYS, a comprehensive policy simulation 
model designed to analyze the impacts of agricultural policy changes. Two alternative 
proportions of base acres returning to crop production are compared to a baseline 
scenario. First, it is assumed that all base acres in the CRP will return to crop 
production. Second, it is assumed that the percent of base acres returning to crop 
production is the rate of recropping estimated under the first objective. The analysis 
does not consider the remaining 12 million acres without crop acreage base. 
POLYS 1M (Policy Simulator) is the econometric component of POL YSYS 
used to estimate annual supply and demand, as well as prices, for major U. S. 
commodities. For this analysis, the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) baseline assumptions are adjusted to represent complete extension of all CRP 
contracts. The F APRI baseline originally assumed 60 percent of the crop base acres 
would return to crop production. These acres were removed and a new baseline was 
created using POL YSIM. 
The expected price, variable costs, and national program acreage for 1996 
from the baseline are supplied to RASS, a linear programming component of 
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POL YSYS. The changes in available crop acreage in each production area of the 
U.S. due to CRP contract expiration are made in RASS. RASS is then used to 
predict changes in harvested acreage, national yields, variable costs, and government 
program participation under the alternative scenarios. The percentage changes for 
each crop are then provided to POL YSIM to estimate the impacts of CRP expiration 
on production and prices of wheat and com for 1996. Using these predictions, the 
1997 price under the alternative scenarios of recropping for each crop is forecast by 
POL YSIM. The procedure is repeated in a recursive framework for each year from 
1996 through 2000 to determine the yearly impacts of CRP expiration of the first nine 
signup periods. 
The results of the analysis show that production and price for both wheat and 
com diverge steadily from the baseline forecasts. Under the 100 percent recropping 
scenario com price declines by a tolal of 5 percent in 2000. Under the most likely 
scenario, com price drops 1. 7 percent. Proportional increases in production account 
for these price declines. If 100 percent of the wheat base acreage in the CRP were to 
return to production, wheat price would decline nearly 13 percent by 2000. If only 
48.2 percent returns the price of wheat would drop more than 7 percent. Wheat 
production shows corresponding increases as contracts expire. 
Lower farm prices for wheat and com may cause a decrease in net farm 
returns. Also, government costs for commodity programs may rise substantially by 
2000 unless the administration uses discretionary power to maintain the loan rate at 
higher levels or the calculation of the loan rate is changed. 
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However, as more grain is produced the volume handled by the grain 
marketing system will increase. This may allow some reprieve to grain elevators who 
have raised bid prices to maintain grain volume under the supply control objective of 
the CRP. Also, convenience yield associated with immediate delivery of grain may 
diminish so that substantiaJly higher returns to storage may occur. 
The future of the CRP will not be certain until the 1995 farm legislation. 
Although this research provides estimates of price and production impacts under 
reasonable scenarios, consideration of other policy and producer aJtematives as more 
information becomes available would provide more detail for policy makers and 
agribusiness decision makers. 
The CRP and Elevator Margins 
Many elevator managers, particularly in areas of high CRP participation, 
believe that the CRP has contributed to their recent financiaJ stress. By diverting 
cropland away from production, the CRP may have caused lower profits and tighter 
marketing margins for country wheat elevators. The third objective of this thesis is to 
determine the affect the CRP has had on marketing margins of wheat elevators. 
The marketing margin is the price for a collection of marketing services which 
is determined by the supply and demand for those services. The CRP has decreased 
the demand for marketing services by suppressing grain production. A theoretical 
model is derived based on the supply of marketing services. Wheat production is 
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used as a proxy for the quantity of marketing services so that the marketing margin is 
ultimately a function of farm prices, input prices, price paid by next-in-line buyers, 
and policy variables which influence agricultural land use. 
An empirical model of elevator margins is specified in accordance with the 
theory derived to explain the variation in marketing margins. Data from a 
cooperative elevator in central Oklahoma is used to demonstrate how the theory could 
be empiricized. 
The results of the model showed that for the case analyzed the most important 
factor in determining the marketing margin was the farm price. In addition, the 
results suggested that the CRP may have marginally impacted the margin received by 
this elevator. This provides the basis for furure research which may utilize a larger 
sample. The small sample used in this analysis is not sufficient to draw any 
reasonably sound inferences on elevator margins after the CRP. However, the sign 
on the parameter estimate for the CRP suggests a need for further investigation. 
More robust estimates will require consideration of a larger population of elevators. 
Further research should consider other elevator activities such as storage and provide 
for a more dynamic analysis. 
Based on the results of the three specific objectives accomplished in this thesis 
it could be concluded that the expiration of Conservation Reserve Program contracts 
set to begin in 1996 will relieve some of the pressure placed on wheat elevators by 
the supply control objective of the CRP. It should be stressed that this analysis is 
conducted based on estimates of land use intentions at the time of the SWCS survey. 
These intentions may change by the time the first contracts are set to expire. In 
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addition, this analysis has been conducted assuming that the CRP will not be extended 
in the l99S farm legislation. 
As the 199S farm legislation is debated the results and implications of this 
analysis must be considered. The Conservation Reserve Program creates a dilemma 
for the future of farm policy. The objectives stated by the Clinton administration 
have been both to protect the environment and to reduce the federal budget deficit. 
Continuation of the CRP would require substantial spending to protect marginal land 
from soil erosion. However, if the CRP is eliminated, commodity program spending 
under the current legislation will increase as farm prices decline in the post-CRP era 
unless the Secretary uses authorized discretion to maintain the loan rate. Government 
program costs and the costs to the environment must be weighed in deciding the 
future of the CRP. The relative importance of the administration's objectives will 
have a profound impact on the future of the CRP. 
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